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     1 Introduction
Whether the behavior of one individual can accurately describe the behavior of the collec-
tion of agents is the topic of decades-long debate in economics. Some people believe the
approximation is useful, even if not very accurate, while others think it is fundamentally
misleading. This central player, on which the bulk of the discipline is built, is called the
\representative agent."
This paper aims to contribute to the debate by demonstrating that the represen-
tative agent can well describe the economic system only in special cases. Most of the
previous eort has gone into the analysis of the representative agent's powers in equi-
librium (Kirman, 1989; 1992). Here we are concerned with her ability to describe the
out-of-equilibrium behavior of dynamic economy.
To analyse the problem we set up a very simple model and study its behavior out
of equilibrium. The important feature of the model is that agents are learning while
the system is out of equilibrium. Learning is the force that drives the economy to a
time-invariant state, which we use as the denition of equilibrium. The equilibrium of
the model is not particularly interesting: it is characterized by agent homogeneity. Thus,
we can predict without any mathematical analysis that the representative agent will be
powerful in equilibrium. This is done intensionally so that we can analyse the out-of-
equilibrium performance of the representative that is powerful in equilibrium.
In our simple model agents are video gamers, and they do only one thing: upgrade
their gaming skills. We consider two variants. In the rst, gamers are learning from
their own gaming history. This is the case where agents are heterogenous but do not
interact with each other. In the second variant, gamers interact and share skills with
each other. We demonstrate that in both cases one needs additional requirements for the
representative agent to be able to describe the dynamics of the society out-of-equilibrium.
2 The Representative Agent and Its Problems
The predecessor of the modern representative agent is, without a doubt, Marshall's (1890)
\representative rm," that was dened as a \fairly" successful rm that was managed
with \normal" ability. However, today the representative agent is a statistical construct.
It is an \average" agent of the economy. Although we were not able to pin down an exact
denition of the modern representative agent anywhere in the literature, after the analysis
of numerous uses of the concept we feel condent to state that the representative agent is
the construct that describes the \average" values of agent-specic variable distributions.
The decades-long literature on the validity of the approach has brought up two major
topics of discussion. The rst is, whether the representative agent can be constructed at
all. In this respect the fundamental contribution is due Rubinstein (1974) who provided
fairly general sucient conditions under which a representative agent can be constructed.
However, as Kirman (1992) argues there can be cases where this kind of \representatives"
will not accurately represent the society. In particular, he shows that one can construct
a setup in which this representative agent prefers one option over the other, while every
member of the society has the reverse preference ordering. Then we have an issue of the
usefulness of the constructed representative agent.
To demonstrate the second discussion point, consider we construct the agent that
closely describes the behavior of the average of some variable. It might well be that
behavioral rules of this agent are dierent from the the behavioral rules of the society
1that it represents. Caballero (1992) points out that the representative agent framework
has \blured the distinction between statements that are valid at the individual level and
those that apply to the aggregate." Schlee (2001) calls this the problem of \normative
representativeness." By his denition, representative agent is a \normative representa-
tive" of the society if, and only if, his behavioral rules are not dierent from those of
agents comprising the society.
Therefore, we can distinguish two essential features of the representative agent. One is
the \normativeness" in Schlee's sense, the other is the \functionality," which means that
the construct is able to describe the averages of important variables. Then, we can have
two types of representative agents: \normative" and \functional." These two constructs
need not coincide. There are serious problems associated with approaches where \norma-
tive" and \functional" representatives diverge (Babutsidze, 2010). Therefore, we believe
that the only useful agent has to be \functional" as well as \normative" representative
of the society.
We think that, by now, merits and problems of the representative agent are well
understood in economic literature. But, this only concerns the performance of the agent
in describing the equilibrium properties. This is natural, as economics has largely been
concerned with equilibria. However, in recent years there has been a substantial increase
in research into out-of-equilibrium behavior. It is tempting to use the representative
agent for these types of analyses. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the performance
of the representative agent during out-of equilibrium dynamics. This is the aim of this
note.
Closest to the exercise presented herein comes the research by Geweke (1985) who
analyses the performance of the representative agent in evaluating the eect of the policy
change. He studies the adjustment process to the new policy, which is similar to the
analysis of the out-of-equilibrium dynamics, as the original arrangement is not equilibrium
after the policy change. Geweke (1985) constructs a model where rms are playing three
roles: they produce, demand production factors and supply products. He demonstrates
that in this economy there will be three dierent representative agents: the average
producer, the average supplier and the rm placing average demand on production factors.
In all three cases representatives are dierent from each other and none of the three predict
the average eect of the policy change correctly.
What we do in this note is somewhat similar. We start our system from the point
out-of-equilibrium and study its transition to equilibrium. But we analyse a simpler and
more general setup. Our agents play a single role and they are homogenous at all times
with respect to all characteristics except the one under discussion. Therefore, there is no
need for several representative agents (which was the case in Geweke, 1985). Agents in
our setup do one simple task: they learn.
3 The model
We use a simple setup of the economy. There is continuum of agents indexed by i
conveniently placed on interval [0;1]. Think of them as gamers that have to decide which
video game to play. They have to make this decision every time period. Time is discrete.
Number of products/games is nite. Each agent has a certain skill level s for each game,
such that st(i) represents the skill level of the gamer i at time t for the game under
discussion. Besides their skills, agents are identical (e.g. laws of motion of skill levels are
2identical across agents).
Consider a setup where quality is constant across options and is known to consumers.
There is no additional network value (direct or indirect) attached to games. Therefore,
consumer decisions are solely based on respective skills. Skills cannot be negative. We
assume they do not depreciate, therefore st(i) is non-decreasing in t. We also assume
they are bounded from above by unity. This assumption is relevant to any product that
requires utilization skills (e.g. consumer electronics). Once the user has become familiar
with all the features of the product her skills cannot increase further. The bound of unity
can be viewed as having 100% of skills for a particular option.
In this note we consider two versions of the model. In the rst variant gamers can
probabilistically choose from multiple options. In this environment we can dene P(x) as
the probability that the consumer will choose the game if her skill level for it is x. P()
is continuous and @P=@x > 0: the more skills an agent has for the game, the higher the
chance that she will play it (ceteris paribus). We assume that skills are augmented by
playing this particular game, therefore this mechanism is similar to increasing returns.
However, in our model this is only a temporary phenomenon: due to the bounded skill
level choice probability for any particular option will increase to a certain point and then
it will decrease as agent continues enhancing skills for alternative options.
In the second variant of the model we discuss an environment where learning takes
place only through interaction with other gamers. Therefore, consumer's choices do
not aect the skill dynamics in society. This gives us the opportunity to simplify the
framework and discuss a setup with only one option on the market.
Our concern is with the gaming skill levels in the society. Therefore, we can dene
the equilibrium of the economy as follows.
Denition 1 (Equilibrium). The system is in equilibrium when st+1(i) = st(i), 8i.
Both of the examples that we discuss ensure the homogeneity of learning prospects of
all gamers (due to equal option qualities and homogenous bounds on skills). Therefore,
the equilibrium as dened here will be characterized by agent homogeneity: everybody
will have the same skill level for all the games. Of course, in this case the representative
agent will have no problem describing the equilibrium. However, our concern is with the
out-of-equilibrium dynamics.
In this environment we can dene the representative agent.
Denition 2 (Representative Agent). The representative agent is an agent that behaves
identically to every other agent and describes the evolution of the average skill level from
the initial state to the equilibrium.
From the denition above it is obvious that we are looking for the representative agent
that is \functional" and \normative" at the same time. If the representative agent, as
described in denition 2, exists it can be further used for the analysis. If it does not exist,
in order to construct another representative agent (that would clearly be a non-normative
representative) we have to rst solve for the evolution path of the average skill level and
only after that create the representative agent that would mimic it. Even if one ignores
the possibility of many behavioral protocols being able to replicate the same route of
average skill evolution, the use of such representative agent will be clearly limited. The
analysis of a slightly dierent problem might call for a dierent representative of the
economy.
34 Results
4.1 Learning by doing
Consider the situation where the only way to augment the skills for a game is to play
it. This is essentially learning by doing (Arrow, 1962). Assume that every time the
gamer plays the game her skills for this particular game increase by [1   st], where st
is the skill level before the play and  2 [0;1] controls the speed of learning. With time
gamers learn and ultimately (as t ! 1) everybody's skill level for every game converges
to the maximum. To simplify the presentation assume that there are several games on
the market for already long enough so that every agent already has maximum skill levels
for all of them. Then the system is in equilibrium and choices are time invariant.
Now consider a new game entering the market with an arbitrary initial skill distribu-
tion, which is described by s0(i). Clearly, the skill level dynamics for each of the agents
depends on her product choices. To analyze it we can use the expected law of motion for
the skill of every agent. The agent i with skill st(i) plays the game at time t with the
probability P (st(i)), to simplify notations we refer to this value as Pt(i). Therefore, with
the same probability her skills increase by [1   st(i)]. However, with the probability
1 Pt(i) skills remain at the same level. Using this logic, we can write down the expected
law of motion:
st+1(i) = st(i) +  [1   st(i)]Pt(i): (1)
Notice that the equation (1) is agent-specic and if one assumes that the initial
distribution is not given by Dirac's delta, we will have heterogeneity in skill development
paths across population. In this context the question arises: do we need to track the skill
level of every agent or we can construct a representative agent which can describe the
dynamics of the society?
Proposition 1. The representative agent will accurately describe the development of the
society if the following requirement is satised




8t, where  st describes the average skill level in population at time t and  Pt = P ( st).
The proof of proposition 1 is given in appendix A
From proposition 1 it is clear that the representative agent, which is clearly powerful
in equilibrium, cannot be directly used for the out-of-equilibrium analysis. For it to
be powerful out of equilibrium we have to impose additional restrictions on our society.
Hence, it is only certain special cases when the representative agent can be used for
out-of-equilibrium analysis. Few of the special cases are presented here.
Examples: There are three straightforward examples that one can construct when the
representative gamer will describe the economy precisely. First of them is when  is zero.
This is easy to infer from equation (3) in appendix A. However, this case means that there
is no learning in the economy, thus no dynamics of skills. Consequently the economy is
already in equilibrium. And by construction, the representative agent is perfectly able
4to describe the economy. Another example is when s0(i) = s, 8i. This case implies
that there is no heterogeneity across population (initial distribution is Dirac's delta). In
this case our best guess of the skill level development is the same for every agent, of
course including the representative. Therefore, representative agent is powerful. This
case is not interesting as is does not permit any heterogeneity, and consequently, it does
not require the representative agent. An example involving heterogeneity and learning
with powerful representative is the case when the function P() is constant. However,
this case completely undermines the model's central assumption that gamers' choices are
determined by the skill levels for games. Here, although there is skill level dynamics,
there is no dynamics in choices. Thus, the skill levels themselves become irrelevant for
describing agent behavior.
Any other instance where the representative agent combining features of \functional-
ity" and \normativeness" will exist in the economy will involve restrictions on functions
P() and/or s0() in order to satisfy the requirement in proposition 1. Unfortunately,
these restrictions are not straightforward to derive.
4.2 Skill Sharing
Now consider the case when there is an interaction among agents. We do not assume
anymore that gamers learn by playing. Rather, we assume that they learn by interaction
with each other. In this case the multiplicity of options does not play a role, thus we
discuss the environment with only one available game. The probability density of the
population skill for this game at time zero is described by f0(s). The interaction structure
is as follows. Every period, every agent (i) randomly picks one other agent (j) from the
population. If j has higher skill then i, i learns from j. As a result, her skills increase
by [s(j)   s(i)], where  2 [0;1] controls the speed of learning. If j's skill level is lower
than that of i's, i cannot learn anything.
One thing to note about this scheme is that the agent who has the highest skill level
in initial distribution (denote it with ^ s), cannot learn anything from anybody in the
population. Everyone else's skill level approaches her skill level asymptotically. Here
again, we are interested in out-of-equilibrium dynamics, and whether the representative
agent can predict how the average skill level approaches its time-invariant value.
Given the description of the model we can specify the expected law of motion for skill
level of an agent i as
st+1(i) = st(i) + 
^ s Z
st(i)
ft(s)[s   st(i)]ds; (2)
Due to the fact that ft(s) is the density function of skill distribution at time t, the second
summand in the right hand side gives the expected increase in the skill level.
In this environment we can formulate following proposition.
Proposition 2. The representative agent will accurately describe the economy if the
following requirement is satised
^ s Z
 st







The proof of proposition 2 is given in appendix B.
As one can see, again, the representative agent that is powerful in equilibrium can
describe the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of the system only in special cases.
Examples: Examples of these cases are when  = 0 or when s0(i) = s, 8i. Both of
these cases imply that the economy starts o at equilibrium, thus, we cannot evaluate
the performance of the representative agent out-of-equilibrium.
Any non-trivial case in which the representative agent of the economy can be con-
structed would require restrictions on the skill probability density functions ft() 8t in
order the requirement in proposition 2 to be satised. Similar to the case discussed in
section 4.1, derivation of these restrictions is not straight forward.
5 Conclusion
In this note we have discussed two types of behavior of collection of heterogeneous agents.
We have demonstrated that even if the representative agent is powerful in equilibrium
she might not be able to describe the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of the society. In
particular, we have shown that the representative agent at time t will not be representative
at time t+1 unless certain functional requirements are satised. This warns against using
representative agent setups for the analysis of out-of-equilibrium dynamics even if one
can demonstrate that the setup is insulated from the standard criticism (which usually
concerns the equilibrium properties of the setup). By analysing two setups, one with
interaction, another { without, we have also established that this phenomenon is not
specic to models with (or without) agent interaction.
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. The representative agent has the average skill level in the initial skill distribution:
sr
0 =  s0 =
1 R
0
s0(i)di. Then, her skill level next period should be
s
r
1 =  s0 +  [1    s0]  P0: (3)







[s0(i) +  [1   s0(i)]P0(i)]di =  s0 + 
1 Z
0
[1   s0(i)]P0(i)di: (4)
From equations (3) and (4) it is obvious that for sr(1) =  s(1) to hold we need
[1    s0]  P0 =
1 Z
0
[1   s0(i)]P0(i)di: (5)
6Equality (5) is the requirement for the representative agent at time zero to be repre-
sentative at time one. But the representative agent has to be able to describe the average
skill level in the society at every time period. Thus, we need the following general equality
to hold
[1    st]  Pt =
1 Z
0
[1   st(i)]Pt(i)di; 8t:
B Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. Our representative agent at time zero has to have a skill level equal to the average
of the society sr
0 =  s0 =
1 R
0
s0(i)di: Then, her skill level at time one will be
s
r
1 =  s0 + 
^ s Z
 s(0)
f0(s)[s    s0]ds: (6)






















By looking at equations (6) and (7) for the equality sr(1) =  s(1) to hold we need
^ s Z
 s0














ft(s)[s   st(i)]dsdi; 8t:
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